ABSTRACT Risk evaluation of the containers remains a difficult task, often due to incomplete or ambiguous information on containers. In addition, the evaluation process needs to be adapted on an ongoing basis to cope with emerging risk factors. Furthermore, high-risk container inspection is commonly hindered by a low inspection capacity, which leads to a major issue: how can we prioritize the container inspection if the number of suspect containers exceeds the inspection capacity? Container inspection prioritizing may be the answer. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adaptively prioritizing container inspection (APRICOIN). First, we enhance the container information flow to alleviate the problem of incomplete information by proposing an enhanced container descriptive. Second, we introduce the APRICOIN algorithm, which combines frequent pattern mining and a fuzzy logic system, to assess the container's risk score. The frequent pattern growth algorithm is proposed to retrieve the key criteria for evaluating container risk. This is done through mining frequent criteria sets within the historic data set of container inspections by customs. The mined frequent criteria sets are used to assess fuzzy inference rules which are periodically readjusted to integrate new key criteria. Thereafter, the fuzzy logic system uses the obtained fuzzy inference rules to calculate a container's risk score. Our major contribution consists of providing a new adaptive approach for assessing a container's risk through combining frequent criteria mining and fuzzy logic. An illustrative study and a comparison with alternative approaches are performed to validate the proposed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of shipping containers in 1960, this has become the standard mode of freight transport [1] . In fact, the number of containers increases each year; from 487 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) in 2007 to 539 million TEU in 2015 [2] , [3] . Hence, container terminals (CT) assure the liability of the freight transport and therefore must be seen as the cornerstone of the global supply chain [4] . However, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, concern has increased about the safety of freight transport [5] . Moreover, the container transport process is threatened by various sources of risk due to market globalization and the emergence of fraudulent activities and terrorism. Therefore, the international community has proposed several initiatives and conventions to improve the safety of maritime transport, such as the Initiative for Safe Containers (ISC) [6] which requires the targeting and inspection of high-risk containers at seaports before shipment.
The adoption of such a security approach is constrained by the impact of these safety measures on CT which compromise their competitiveness [7] . For instance, CT must be able to handle large numbers of containers in a timely manner and for as little cost as possible to satisfy client demand, while carrying out security measures targeting and inspecting high-risk containers. In addition, CT only inspects a limited number of containers and cannot increase their inspection capacity due to various drawbacks such generated delays, limited inspection resources, and cost-related problems. For instance, on average, the number of containers passing through Le Havre seaport that undergo a thorough inspection by customs in 2013 is only 1.6% of the total number of containers [7] , [8] . Furthermore, the limited inspection capacity becomes very constraining if the number of suspect containers is beyond the inspection capacity. Consequently, the prioritization of suspect containers is important.
The precision of the container's risk quantification process is strongly related to two main factors. The first factor is the availability and correctness of a container's descriptive information at their declaration to customs. The second factor is the subjectivity of a container's risk evaluation by customs agents [10] who often rely on their experience in targeting fraudulent containers, which is relatively ineffective in the case of a false declaration within the container's manifests and descriptive. Furthermore, a fraudulent container can affect CT activities. For example, it can spark a fire due to neglect of the segregation rules applied to hazardous materials. Similar events can lead to extensive loss and weaken the competitiveness of ports. Therefore, improving the precision and accuracy of the container's risk quantification is key by enriching the information flow related to the container's transport process and ensuring its truthfulness, and secondly by improving the accuracy of the risk quantification process by adapting its inference rules.
To this end, the first step consists of enhancing the container information flow to alleviate the problem of incomplete and ambiguous descriptive information. This is done by proposing an enhanced container descriptive (ECD) by following the idea of the intelligent container and all the potential it offers. The intelligent container concept is born from the adaptation of various concepts such as the intelligent product (IP) [11] , [12] , the Internet of Things and autonomous logistics [13] , so the container can provide, but is not limited to, an integrated and unbiased information flow. In this study we assume that all the containers are ''intelligent'' and able to provide an ECD. The second step consists of assessing a container's risk score. For this purpose, we suggest the use of frequent pattern mining and fuzzy logic. The FP-Growth algorithm is proposed to mine the most relevant criteria within the historic dataset of container inspection by customs. The mined frequent criteria sets are used to assess fuzz inference rules. The FP-Growth algorithm is executed periodically to detect emerging key criteria to proactively adapt the fuzzy inference rules to emerging risk factors. Thereafter, the fuzzy inference system uses these rules to assess a risk score. The main reason for using fuzzy logic is to alleviate the risk evaluation subjectivity [10] . Fuzzy logic tolerates the use of vague and imprecise information in a decision, similar to the approach used by customs in targeting containers for inspection. Moreover, it is based on natural language, which allows extracting customs experience and their qualitative judgments.
The major contribution of this work is the introduction of a novel approach for prioritizing container inspections (APRICOIN), which assesses for each container a risk score by exploiting the capabilities of the intelligent container, and by combining the frequent pattern algorithm FP-Growth with a fuzzy logic system. What is compelling about this combination is that it improves the risk quantification precision by calculating a risk score, and through this gives the ability to rank containers. This provides customs with a better view of the relative magnitude of a suspect container's risk and therefore enables the identification and prioritization of high-risk suspect containers for thorough inspection.
An illustrative study on high-risk containers targeted at the Multi Modal Terminal (MMT) CT of Le Havre seaport is introduced to validate the proposed approach. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is evaluated by means of a comparison to a two alternative approaches. The first alternative approach uses the multi-criteria analysis method AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) [14] . AHP has been selected as a baseline approach because AHP gives the possibility to assign to each alternative a score in order to prioritize the alternatives choice [15] . However, other methods such ELECTRE or PROMETHEE only gives you the best alternative and do not take into account the measure of preference of alternatives [15] . Furthermore, AHP is considered appropriate for cases where decision-maker judgement is subjective and based on intuition and experience. The second alternative approach is based on APRIORI algorithm [16] , [17] to extract association rules from the historic dataset of container inspections.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section II provides an overview of the literature. We tackle related works on initiatives and risk management approaches related in particular to containers and CT risk management. In addition, we address risk assessment methods. Section III details the proposed approach and the architecture of the proposed APRICOIN algorithm. In addition, we detail the concept of the intelligent container and the ECD. Finally in section III, we detail the implementation of the FP-Growth algorithm, the fuzzy rules assessment, and the fuzzy logic system parameters. Section IV presents an illustrative study and provides a comparison between the proposed approach and other approaches. We conclude with a discussion of the contributions, the limits, and the perspectives of this work.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
CTs are the cornerstone of the maritime transport system and constitute a critical node in the global supply chain. However, CTs are vulnerable to intrusion and misuse of their operation [8] ; for example, a container may undergo alteration of its contents for illegal goods transport (drugs, weapons). Therefor CTs are a potential hub for illegitimate activities from smuggling activities to terrorist attacks.
However, researchers and international organization have not taken seriously the security of CTs, notably the targeting and inspection of high-risk containers. The authors in [4] and [18] - [21] have detailed the main security standards and normatives introduced after 9/11. Papa [6] presented a comparison between the different security initiatives taken in the US and Europe, and gives a detailed description of each initiative. Table 1 shows a list of the main proposed or revised security standards and initiatives. The initiative most related to container security is the CSI. It requires the identification and inspection of suspicious containers before shipping to the United States. The United States Customs and Borders Protection (CBP) in collaboration with the World Customs Organisation (WCO) is responsible for the implementation of the CSI. CBP relies on various information resources to target high-risk containers. Specifically, the CBP established the 10+2 rules [22] that request importers to provide 10 data elements, such as the country of origin, and two data elements from vessel carriers, such as the container's position within the vessel. CBP uses an Automated Targeting System (ATS) [23] . ATS is a support decision tool to help target containers for inspections. It uses weighted rules to assign a risk score to inbound containers.
However, the cited security standards and initiatives do not directly analyse their applications and do not assess the impact of their integration of on the CT performance [24] . For instance, the CSI skips the establishment methodologies and the evaluation of their impact on CTs competitiveness. This leads us to a main issue regarding containers inspection: how to conciliate between the percentage of the inspected containers and the generated delays? Najib et al. [25] propose a simulation of containers inspection process with different inspection percentage, and they used the container delivery time as one of the performance indicators. Lewis et al. [26] propose a heuristic approach to trade-off between container inspections and vessel departure time. Further academic studies [24] , [27] , [28] have been conducted using simulationbased approaches and shows that the inspection percentage should not exceed a mid-single-digit percentage.
Other studies have been carried on technologies and how they can improve inspection techniques and contribute to enhance containers security. Hargather et al. [29] proposed a non-intrusive technique to detect explosive particles within containers using air suction sensors. Janssens-Maenhout et al. [30] was based on measuring the level of radioactivity in the container to prevent the smuggling of chemical weapons. Ramirez-Marquez [31] proposes a suspicious container identification strategy based on noninvasive inspection using sensors that scan the container. Rizzo et al. [32] developed a solution based on the integration of RFID tags for the creation of seals capable of recording unauthorized container opening temptations which can compromise the container cargo. Further studies have introduced an intelligent containers, born from the concept of intelligent product [11] . Kim et al. [33] proposed an intelligent container equipped with various sensors (RFID, GPS, ...) and interconnected to other containers via a wireless sensor network to enhance security. Sallez et al. [34] Studied the design of physical internet containers and their associated activeness. Haas et al. [13] conducted a study that shows the ability of the intelligent container to reduce transport costs using the information it gathers through its sensors. Thus, we believe in the potential of the concept of the intelligent container and its ability to gather and provide an enriched yet truthful information flow regarding containers.
The reviewed literature shows that there is a lack of studies on how to improve inspection efficiency by prioritizing container inspection through risk quantification. Most of the reviewed studies keen to trade-off inspection percentage rather than ameliorate the inspection process itself. As of targeting high-risk containers, a study [24] proposes container risk index but do not provide a viable solution on how to carry out such index. The ATS used by CBP rely mainly on intelligence information's to adjust their weighted rules for risk score assessment [23] . Other studies focus more on the technological aspect, for instance the concept of the intelligent container and how this can gather relevant information and contribute to reduce threats to which containers are exposed, which is valuable for risk quantification. Consequently, there is a great need to improve the inspection process eventually without affecting the CT performance. This can be done through prioritizing high-risk container inspection. Thus, we intend to contribute to the state of the art by introducing the APRICOIN algorithm for prioritizing container inspection.
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM A. APPROACH OVERVIEW
In general, risk is calculated as the product of the probability of failure (Pof) and the cost of failure (Cof). To reduce the risk, we can either reduce the Pof or/and the Cof. In our case, the Pof corresponds to the probability of failure of customs to intercept a high risk container carrying illicit or hazardous materials, and the Cof corresponds to the consequences that can be caused by these materials. In our case, we are in a more preventive approach. Henceforth, to reduce the risk we focus on reducing the Pof by prioritising high risk containers inspection.
Targeting high-risk containers for inspection in CTs is hindered by several difficulties. The major difficulty is the limited inspection capacity due to limited equipment and manpower for carrying out inspections. This becomes very constraining if the number of suspect containers is beyond the inspection capacity, hence the need for a ranking system to prioritize container inspections. The proposed approach for the ranking of suspect containers was established on the enhancement of the containers information flow, and on the combination of frequent patterns mining algorithm and fuzzy logic system. What is significant about this approach is that it allows the ranking of containers by their risk score. This provides a better view of the relative magnitude of the suspect container's risk and therefore enables the identification and prioritization of high-risk suspect containers for thorough inspection. To address the issue, a three-step process was created. Fig.1 depicts an overview of this process. The first step deals with the container information flow. We are aware of the negative impact of information unavailability or false declarations within the container descriptive on the risk quantification process. Hence, we believe that working based on the intelligent container concept may alleviate this problem. The intelligent container has several advantages. The first advantage is its ability to collect, store, and transmit information throughout its transportation process. This enables the detection of any unauthorized alteration of the container which may lead to a false declaration. The second advantage is the quantitative nature of some of the information provided by the intelligent container, which helps in assessing the risk score precisely. Accordingly, all this information is structured in a set of criteria aggregated under what is referred to as the ECD. In this paper we assume that all the containers are ''Intelligent'' and capable of providing an ECD. Further details about the ECD are given in the next Section B.
The second step has the two-fold objective of evaluating the container risk and generating a risk score. The first subobjective is the fuzzy inference rules assessment. Commonly, in fuzzy logic systems, the inference rules are created from scratch through collaboration with domain experts. However, in our approach, we help in carrying out inference rules in a semi-automated process using frequent pattern sets as follows. The aim of frequent pattern mining is to discover key ECD criteria that high-risk containers tend to have in common. The FP-Growth algorithm is used to mine frequent ECD criteria from the ECD archives of containers who were subject to conclusive customs inspection. The mined frequent ECD criteria are used to assess the fuzzy inference rules, and stored in the FIR (fuzzy inference rules) database. The fuzzy inference rules assessment process is detailed in next section C part 2. The second sub-objective is the container risk score assessment using a fuzzy logic inference engine.
The final step involves putting together containers ordered by their risk scores for the purpose of prioritizing their inspection and scanning by customs. Finally, to adaptively improve the accuracy of the system, only ECDs of containers leading to positive customs inspection feeds the inspections historic database. We note that we consider a customs inspection as positive if it leads to finding illicit or hazardous materials.
B. THE ENRICHED CONTAINER DESCRIPTIVE (ECD)
In this work, the proposed ECD is established from the container's descriptive as proposed by [35] and [36] , the report of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) [37] , and criteria used by Le Havre seaport customs to target suspect containers. The produced ECD contains a set of more than 30 criteria. Only some of the criteria will be reported in this paper due to the confidential nature of such information. In practice, the ECD is an aggregation of information from different sources. We consider the following sources:
• Intelligent container sensors • Container transport history • Container configuration The intelligent container logs all the events occurring during the container transport internally or externally (e.g., unauthorized access) through its sensors. In addition, it provides the path taken by the container and its stop points, which mainly serves to detect whether the container has parked in an unsecured section or has made an unauthorized detour. The container transport history contains all the information related to the transport company and transport itinerary. The container configuration contains information about the container type and cargo type.
The ECD criteria data type varies between nominative and quantitative data. Table 2 shows some ECD criteria and the corresponding data type. In order to make the ECD usable by the fuzzy system, quantitative and nominative data should be converted into qualitative data through what we have named the conversion table. Table 3 shows the conversion table used.
We note that qualitative data and ranges will be used in the definition of the membership functions (next section C part 3), and in the APRICOIN algorithm.
C. CONTAINER RISK ASSESSMENT 1) FREQUENT PATTERN MINING
Usually, the evaluation of a container's risk is based on the experience of customs and their ability to analyse various criteria describing the container. Hence, the historical dataset VOLUME 5, 2017 of suspect containers, who were subject to a positive customs inspection, embodies all the experience acquired by customs and the key criteria for an accurate container risk evaluation. Frequent pattern (FP) mining may be the answer for extracting key criteria from the inspections dataset. The FP-Growth algorithm is based on one of the fastest approaches for discovering frequently co-occurring items [38] . According to [39] FP-Growth has relatively few drawbacks and outperforms standard mining algorithms such Apriori [17] .
FP-Growth is based on a prefix tree called FP-Tree which represents the given transactions database, in occurrence the inspections historic database, into a highly condensed data structure. Adopting such structure significantly reduces the FP search space. The original algorithm was first presented by [40] . However, since the FP-growth works for Boolean data only, we need to convert the ECD qualitative values into Boolean (true and false) values. To do so we suggest a function named ECDtoBoolean (Fig.2) that has as an ECD as input and outputs a Boolean ECD. This function is used to populate the transactions database (DB) that will be used by the FP-Growth algorithm. We note that the Boolean ECD will have three times more attributes than the normal ECD. Fig.3 shows a basic ECD structure vs a Boolean ECD structure. Fig. 4 shows an example of a FP-Tree and the extracted frequent item sets.
Henceforth, FP-Growth efficiently helps in the mining of frequent patterns, which in our case will correspond to most frequent ECD criteria within the historic inspections database. Although FP-Growth may produce dozens of frequent patterns, many of these are not relevant. Therefore, it is important to apply interestingness measures [41] to decide whether a frequent pattern is interesting. For this purpose, we use objective interestingness measures. For instance, we use the support and the item set minimum length. The support is the fraction of transactions containing the item set. An item set is considered interesting if it has a support above a given threshold. The FP-Growth uses the item set minSupp as a support threshold to eliminate an uninteresting item set. A minimum length of item set is used to sift the results of FP-Growth. For example, we only consider an item set with a minimum of three criteria. An example of a mined frequent set of three criteria is as follows:
{criterion1.high | criterion2.medium|criterion3.medium}
2) FUZZY INFERENCE RULES
The fuzzy inference rules incorporate the experience and knowledge of the customs agents regarding high-risk container targeting. A fuzzy inference rule is composed of two parts: the antecedent which is delimited by the IF-THEN words, and the consequent which comes after the word THEN [42] . For instance, the antecedent part will be composed of the mined frequent ECD criteria. To assess these rules, we opt for a semi-automatic process. Together with customs agents, we assess rules based on the mined frequent criteria.
The extracted association rules will be in the form: if (x is A) and (y is B) then R is C where x, y are criteria, R is the container risk, and A, B, C are their quantitative values.
The following rule shows an example of an assessed fuzzy inference rule.
if (C1 is high) and (C2 is low) Then Risk is medium

3) FUZZY INFERENCE SYSTEM
The establishment of a fuzzy system for risk quantification requires a detailed description of its components. To this end, we propose a process for description in three steps as depicted in Fig. 5 . The first step concerns the fuzzification step. The second step focuses on the fuzzy inference engine. The final step tackles the de-fuzzification and final risk score calculation.
The first step is the fuzzification. It consists of converting the quantitative or nominative values of each criterion to crisp values, and afterwards to qualitative values (refer to  Tables 2 and 3) . To do this, we define a fuzzy set for each criterion. Unlike classical sets which have a membership degree of 0 or 1, a fuzzy set provides a gradual transition of the membership degree. In practice, a fuzzy set is defined using membership functions (MF). Literature has suggested different shapes of MF [43] , [44] . However, in the field of risk assessment, triangular and trapezoidal MFs are commonly used. For example, [45] used a trapezoidal MF to design a fuzzy logic system for a process risk assessment.
Thus, all the quantitative and nominative criteria of the ECD should be associated with their corresponding fuzzy set. To define the number of MFs, we adopted the approach of starting with smallest number of MF [46] . Accordingly, we started with three MF and its leads to a satisfactory results. Consequently, we define three qualitative categories: high, medium, and low. Accordingly, each criterion fuzzy set will be defined by three trapezoidal MF. Fig. 6 shows an example of the three MFs corresponding to a given criterion fuzzy set.
A MF of a fuzzy set A is commonly noted as µA. The membership degree of a variable x is noted as µA(x).
The MF low is defined by two points (x1,x2). Accordingly, the MF low will be defined as:
The MF medium is defined by four points (x1,x2,x3,x4). Accordingly, the MF medium will be defined as:
The MF high is defined by two points (x3,x4). Accordingly, the MF high will be defined as:
All the crisp values of the variable X can be fuzzified through the three MFs (low, medium, high) in the Fig. 6 , for example, if we assume that Xn is a crisp value, the degree of the membership of Xn for the MF low is 0.25 and for the MF medium is 0.75 (see Fig. 6 ). Fig. 7 illustrate membership functions that have been used for the criterion 3 referring to the logistics company based on the CTPAT audit score. The second step is the fuzzy inference. This triggers the fuzzy association rules to infer a conclusion. The definition of fuzzy association rules has been discussed. In practice, fuzzy implication operators are used to interpret the fuzzy association rules. The most used implication operator is the Mamdani minimum implication [45] . The value of the Mamdani minimum implication is min(µ_A (x),µ_B (y)). The minimum implication operates to take the minimum membership degree of x and y. The inference engine is responsible for applying the fuzzy association rules to the fuzzified values to produce a fuzzy result.
The final step is the de-fuzzification. This step transforms the fuzzy results into a crisp result. There are several methods of de-fuzzification [47] ; the method that we adopted is the centre of gravity (COG) method [48] . COG is probably the most used technique. This technique defines the result by calculating the abscissa of the centre of gravity of the surface of the membership function characterizing the fuzzy set resulting from the inference step. COG can be expressed as:
The APRICOIN algorithm (Fig. 8) gives a detailed description of the main steps for the adaptive prioritization of container inspections using the FP-Growth algorithm and fuzzy logic. The APRICOIN has two inputs: the inspection history of containers, and the containers to be prioritized for inspection. Both inputs are sets of ECDs. The output is a list of containers ranked by their risk score.
The first step of the APRICOIN algorithm aims to prepare the input dataset in Boolean form for the FP-Growth algorithm. Accordingly, we look over the inspections history, extract criteria, and convert it to Boolean form. The conversion process is performed through the function ECDtoBoolean (see Fig.2 ). The Boolean ECDs are then stored in the database booleanInspectHist.
The second step consists of mining frequent criteria from the inspections history to construct the fuzzy inference rules. This step is repeated each month in order to adapt the fuzzy inference rules to any emerging criteria. To do this, we call the FP-Growth algorithm to mine frequent criteria from the Boolean inspection history (booleanInspectHist). The mined frequent criteria sets (FCriteriaSets) are then used to asses fuzzy inference rules as described in Section III.C part 2.
Once all the rules are assessed and stored into the rules database, we move to the third step.
The third step is to assess a container's risk score through the fuzzy inference engine. For each ECD, we use the function getQuant to extract quantitative values of its criteria (see Tables 2 and 3 ). Thereafter, we call the fuzzy inference engine with the fuzzy rules and the quantitative criteria as input. The obtained scores are stored in the scores list named scoresList.
The fourth step is the container ranking, which consists of sorting the scoreList, then trimming the list using the inspections rate as a limit (e.g. if we have 1.8% of the inspections rate, we select only 1.8% of the containers beginning from the highest score on the sorted list). As a result, we have a list of inspections priority. The final step consists of feeding the inspections history with the ECDs of the inspected containers with concluding inspection results.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY
The illustrative study addresses suspect containers risk ranking in the multimodal terminal (MMT) of Le Havre seaport. The MMT acts as pivot point between the landside and the waterside for import/export containers. Over 300.000 containers transit through the MMT per year. MMT customs control container flow for export and import, and evaluates cargo risk for thorough inspection. The inspection capacity of MMT is 1.8%. In this illustrative study, we will simulate the proposed approach to analyse a dataset of 300,000 ECD with an inspection capacity of 1.8% and a 3.6% of high-risk ECD with various risk degree. In addition, two alternative approaches based on AHP and APRIORI are simulated over the same dataset to compare its outcome with results of the proposed approach.
The comparison between the two approaches will be based on the precision [49] of the ranked list, and the ability to adapt to emerging key criteria. The precision is the fraction of the high-risk ECDs (i.e. ECDs of containers with a very high-risk that should be inspected in priority) among the top-ranked ECDs to be inspected (1.8%).
A. APPLICATION
To carry out a simulation of the proposed approach we will need two ECD datasets: a first ECD dataset that will serve to simulate the transiting containers through the MMT over one year, and a second ECD dataset that will serve to simulate the historical inspections. For simulation purposes, we have chosen 12 ECD criteria as key criteria. In the absence of such datasets, we developed a Java-based program to generate container ECD datasets. Firstly, we generated 12 datasets of 25,000 ECD to simulate the containers transiting through the MMT over 12 months. Among each dataset, 3.6% (900 ECD) are high-risk container ECDs with various risk degrees. In order to check the ranking precision of both approaches, we have generated 900 high-risk ECDs as follows: 50% are very high-risk ECDs, and 50% are high-risk ECDs. Very high-risk ECDs are generated to fulfil all 12 key criteria. High-risk ECDs fulfil 8 key criteria. We note that all the generated highrisk ECDs are marked so we can evaluate the precision of each approach. In addition, starting from January dataset, we increase the frequency of a given criteria within the high-risk ECDs that feeds back to the historical inspections database. This aims to test the adaptability of the proposed approach to emerging key criteria.
To simplify the simulation, we assume that all the high risk containers leads to a positive customs inspection. A positive inspection usually leads customs to find illicit or hazardous materials in a container. Accordingly, each month we feed back the historical inspections database with the top ranked 450 ECDs. Secondly, we generate the inspections historic datasets. This dataset contains 5,000 ECD of highrisk containers. We note that we have chosen only 5,000 ECD as a historical inspections dataset to ease the emergence of new key criteria from the feedback ECDs. In the generation process, a high-risk container is a container which fulfils a number of ECD key criteria. We used triangular distribution in the generation process to make the chosen 12 ECD key criteria more frequent.
The implementation of the APRICOIN algorithm goes first by implementing the FP-Growth algorithm. We have implemented the FP-Growth algorithm using the SPMF (Sequential Pattern Mining Framework) data mining framework [50] . The previously generated historical dataset is mined by the FP-Growth to retrieve key criteria to assess fuzzy inference rules. Afterwards, we will assess the ECDs risk score using the fuzzy inference system and provide a ranked list of ECDs. We have implemented the proposed fuzzy system using the JFuzzyLogic library [51] . JFuzzyLogic is an open source library written in Java and uses a Mamdani based inference engine.
As in the AHP based approach, we used the jAHP framework to implement the AHP multi-criteria approach. AHP criteria weights were based on the previously chosen 12 key criteria. We note that the AHP criteria weights are fixed and do not adapt. Accordingly, the APRICOIN algorithm and the AHP method are then executed for each month dataset.
For the APRIORI based approach, we used the original APRIORI algorithm as proposed by Agrawal [17] to mine the association rules which will be used to target high risk containers. We used JESS rules engine [52] to implement the APRIORI algorithm. JESS provides the RETE inference engine, which ensures the application of mined rules to the ECDs.
To compare the performance of the proposed approach with the alternative approaches, we use the ranking precision as performance indicator. For instance, we will measure the proportion of the very high-risk ECDs among the ECDs of containers to be inspected (i.e. the top 1.8% of the ranked list). The precision is calculated using the following formula: precision = very high risk ECDs ECDs to be inspected VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 9. Frequent item sets evolution. Another key performance indicator is the accuracy of the system. In this illustrative case, the accuracy corresponds to the ratio of positive inspections among the containers to be inspected. However, since we assume that all the generated high-risk containers will lead to a positive inspection result, the accuracy will lead to the same result as the precision. Nevertheless, the proposed system takes into account the accuracy improvement by feeding the historic database with only positive inspection ECDs.
B. RESULTS DISCUSSION
To show the adaptability of the proposed approach to emerging criteria, we show in Fig. 9 the evolution of frequent criteria sets during the execution of the APRICOIN over 12 months. As mentioned before, we start increasing the frequency of a given criteria starting from January, for instance the itemset5 criteria. The APRICOIN has found four itemsets from the 5000 inspections historic datasets. Henceforth, APRICOIN starts with four itemsets in January. However, starting from September, criteria itemset5 support reached the minimum support threshold and therefore it has been considered as a new frequent itemset. Adding new frequent itemset will directly impact the fuzzy rules database. For instance, a new fuzzy rule will be assessed and will influence the ranking precision.
As for the APRIORI, it mined only 1 rule from the 5000 inspections historic datasets. Accordingly, APRIORI will start January with only one rule. Fig.10 shows the evolution of the number of rules by both APRICOIN and APRIORI. In March, APRIORI generated 3 rules. However, starting from April it keeps 2 rules for the rest of the year.
To test both AHP, APRIORI, and APRICOIN precision, we increased gradually each month the number of positive high risk containers fulfilling the itemset 5 criteria. Fig. 11 shows the ranking precision of the AHP, APRIORI and APRICOIN over 12 months. AHP cannot cope with the increasing number of positive high-risk containers fulfilling the itemsset5, and its precision start to drop starting from August. This is mainly because it does not adapt to emerging key criteria of itemset 5. In the case of APRIORI, in January, the precision rate is 14% percent because the APRIORI rules base contains only 1 rule. This wake rate is justified by the irrelevance of the generated rule due to the weak number of containers stored in the historic inspections dataset in regards to APRIORI. In February, APRIORI updated its only rules hence the slight improvement in precision rate, which increased to 36%. In March, it generates three rules and improves the precision rate to 61%. Starting from April, APRIORI uses only 2 rules. APRIORI precision decreased starting from August due to the emerging key criteria; however, it needed more time (September, October, November) to catch up.
In the other hand, the precision of the APRICOIN also begins to drop starting from June to August because of the increasing number of positive high-risk containers fulfilling the itemsset5. However, starting from September, APRICOIN have detected the emerging Itemsets5 and added a new fuzzy rule based on itemset5 new key criteria. This allowed APRICOIN to re-establish its precision rate starting from September.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a prioritizing algorithm (APRICOIN) for the inspection of high-risk containers. The proposed solution exploits the potential of the intelligent container concept to enhance the informative flow through the ECD, and combines frequent pattern mining techniques with a fuzzy system to assess the container's risk score. Inspection prioritization is based on the container's risk score. This assists customs agents in targeting high-risk containers and prioritizing their inspection.
We conducted a simulation to validate this solution. We generated a dataset of 300,000 ECD to simulate container traffic in the MMT of Le Havre seaport. In addition, a historical dataset of 5,000 high-risk ECDs was generated to simulate the inspections historical database. The proposed approach uses fuzzy logic to assess a container's risk score. Two alternative approaches based on AHP and APRIORI were simulated to assess the container's risk score. We found that both proposed and the alternative approaches were able to assess a risk score; however, the proposed approach outperforms the AHP and APRIORI approach in terms of the precision of the risk scores assessment. Furthermore, unlike in the alternative approaches, the proposed approach succeeds in adapting to the emerging key criteria and retains its precision.
The major contribution of our study involves the formulation of a new container inspections prioritization algorithm APRICOIN. The proposed approach goes beyond a simple fuzzy logic system for risk score assessment. It implements a semi-automated generation of fuzzy inference rules based on the FP-Growth algorithm. This allows the automatic discovery of key criteria for targeting high-risk containers, based on the historical inspection database. Furthermore, it allows detection and adaptation to emerging key criteria. In addition, the integration of fuzzy logic improves the precision of the container's risk evaluation.
There are still several opportunities for future work. The adjustment of fuzzy inference rules and the accuracy improvement is of keen interest. To this aim, it will be interesting to automatically measure the interestingness of inference rules and adjust their weight. We are currently investigating an algorithm that addresses the interestingness and conciseness of fuzzy inference rules. In addition, we seek to allow the system for informing CTs about the potential need to increase inspection capacity. 
